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Abstract: Upcoming deployments of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) in Europe are
expected to sign and verify packets secured by cryptographic signatures by default. Thus, when
VANET simulations are used for development and test of applications building upon vehicular
communication, the overhead induced by security extensions to the ITS-G5 protocol stack
shall not be neglected. This paper presents a standard compliant simulation model capable to
handle secured messages. Beside its suitability for Hardware-in-the-Loop simulations employing
secured communication, the model’s major advantage is the minimisation of the simulation
environment’s performance penalty linked with cryptographic computations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As cars become more interconnected, one of the main
challenges that manufacturers have to face is security.
Especially for safety applications it is essential to ensure
that life-critical information cannot be modified or dropped
by an attacker’s activity. Even informatory applications,
which do not take control of the vehicle, are only useful
when the driver is warned in time and not bothered
by false warnings. Safe and reliable operation is even
more of concern for Advanced Driver Assistance Systems
(ADASs) intervening in actuators like steering or brakes.
Hence, communication mechanisms shall constitute a safe
environment for interconnected vehicles by establishing the
three major pillars of security: Confidentiality, integrity
and availability.
Future automated cars will rely on high quality inter-vehicle
communication (IVC) that is incorporated with safety
applications. With increasing levels of driving automation
the reliable and far-sighted perception of surrounding traffic
gains importance. A vehicle can perceive its environment
either by mounted sensors or by receiving beacons sent by
vehicles in the vicinity. These periodically emitted beacons
may even convey additional information such as vehicle
weights or planned manoeuvres, which are not measurable
by sensors but can be propagated by IVC. In case of an
emergency, event-driven messages can be generated and
disseminated to endangered vehicles in the zone of relevance
(ZOR). With safety concerns in mind, tackling of jamming
threats is critical, especially in ZORs.
The area of security threats for VANETs has been widely
investigated. Various attacks are possible, such as Denial
of Service (DoS) attack, Fabrication, Alteration, Replay,
Message Suppression, and Sybil attack (Douceur, 2002).
One group of VANET attackers is formed by selfish drivers,
who try to take advantage of received information for
personal benefit. Apart from that, malicious attackers
(Buttyán et al., 2007) aim for harming users or the
network in general. In a black hole attack, a malicious
node exploits the packet routing mechanism, advertising
itself as providing the shortest path and attracting most
of the traffic its way (Bibhu et al., 2012). When this route
is established, the malicious node decides whether to drop
all packets or forward them to an unknown address.
A substantial amount of research on defense mechanisms
has been focused on intrusion detection systems (IDSs)
for early detection of malicious nodes (Maglaras, 2015;
Larson et al., 2008; Müter et al., 2010). In this regard, both
specification-based (Larson et al., 2008) and anomaly-based
treatments (Müter et al., 2010) have been investigated.
Moreover, an attempt to deflect attacks using honeypots
has been described in Verendel et al. (2008), while other
novel techniques for filtering out tweaked data have been
recently developed (Basaras et al., 2015).
Cryptography is one of the mechanisms that can solve a
lot of VANET systems’ security issues (Mejri et al., 2014).
Modern cryptography offers several security features such
as confidentiality, authentication, integrity, non-repudiation
and secret sharing, which provide a secure environment
for communications among vehicles (Pathan, 2010). Unfor-
tunately, cryptography is linked with computational cost
which can grow to an impediment, especially when all
costs accumulate at one computer as it usually arises with
VANET simulations.
2. MOTIVATION & CONTRIBUTIONS
Simulations are a great tool for examining VANETs since
no special hardware is required and even complex scenarios
can be investigated without the difficulties of conducting
field tests involving an immense number of network nodes.
For determining the feasibility of novel vehicle features
such as cooperative manoeuvre planning, simulations are
an adequate and inexpensive tool. At some point on the
path towards system testing a real piece of hardware,
e.g. an on-board unit (OBU), shall be coupled with the
simulation environment forming an IVC testbed. In most
cases it is impossible to slow down hardware execution so
the simulation environment needs to run in real-time for
this setup. The demand for fast execution times imposes a
compromise between realism and computational complexity
of the simulation model. Still, the model needs to be
accurate enough, i.e. it has to serve standard compliant
packets when a device under test (DUT) is connected
to the testbed through its radio interface. The value of
such test facilities incorporating real devices is underlined
by repeatedly organised Intelligent Transportation System
(ITS) plugtest events by the European Telecommunications
and Standard Institute (ETSI).
Applications and systems based on IVC possess an intrinsic
level of complexity due to the nature of its decentralised
algorithms. Because of this complexity, subtle errors slip
easily into simulation models or their parameterisation
and deteriorate simulation results in the end. Model
validation and elimination of faulty behaviour can be
achieved by testing the simulation model against third-
party implementations, such as OBUs for IVC. Hence,
support for testbed execution can increase the trust in a
simulation model, even when the model is used in a solely
virtual environment. Depending on the testing objective,
either the simulation model can be evaluated against a
mature OBU or vice versa.
Testbeds for VANETs in a laboratory environment have
been proposed before as by Vandenberghe et al. (2011).
While their testbed architecture is composed of a multitude
of devices, our approach relies more heavily on simulation
technology which is described initially in Riebl and Facchi
(2014). The focus of our architecture is the environment
emulation for one single DUT. For this purpose, the
DUT’s communication partners are simulated and the
simulation is coupled with the DUT over the radio interface,
which adheres to the IEEE 802.11p standard (see Fig. 1).
Within the simulation’s virtual world the physical DUT
is represented by a proxy vehicle acting on behalf of the
DUT and passing information back and forth. Both, proxy
and DUT, can be looked upon as counterparts.
Previously, our simulation framework Artery 1 (Riebl
et al., 2015) was capable to take time delays and packet
length overhead into account for simulations without
involvement of a DUT. With this paper we enhance
the simulation by secured messages as specified in ETSI
(2015). This enables the communication between DUT and
virtual environment via secured messages, i.e. the over-
the-air packets are cryptographically signed and follow the


























Fig. 1. Simulation and DUT testbed
frameworks as in DOT (2011, Appendix G) these extensions
are not primarily intended for evaluating various security
mechanisms. Instead, the presented testbed enables DUT
tests with low hardware requirements (at the minimum a
simulation computer, IEEE 802.11p capable network card
and a DUT) based on standard compliant packets.
Contributions of this paper comprise in a nutshell:
• enhanced simulation model regarding secured mes-
sages compliant to standards (Section 3.1)
• efficient DUT integration into security-aware testbed
through over-the-air packets (Section 3.2)
• evaluation in terms of runtime costs for various
settings on two independent systems (Section 4)
The discussion of current limitations and ideas for further
improvements concludes the paper (Section 5).
3. MODEL DESIGN
Conceptually, security is considered a cross-layer entity in
the ETSI ITS reference architecture (ETSI, 2010), i.e. it is
a collaborative effort with several involved communication
layers. The lowest layer concerned about security in the
ITS-G5 protocol stack is the GeoNetworking layer (ETSI,
2014a), just above the Medium Access Control (MAC)
layer. The primary purpose of the GeoNetworking layer
is the routing of packets from source to one or more
destination nodes, possibly with help of forwarding nodes
in between. The routing layer, however, is also capable
to encapsulate the payload data from upper layers into
so-called secured messages. As part of this encapsulation
process all payload and some of parts of the GeoNetworking
headers are cryptographically secured employing elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC). Secured messages can employ
encryption but for car safety applications confidentiality is
not an issue because all vehicles should be able to interpret
the disseminated data. Integrity and authenticity, however,
are of importance so faulty or manipulated packets can
be detected and in the end rejected at receiver side. Thus,
the focus lies on cryptographic signatures in the following,
employing the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA) scheme.
3.1 Security extension
Analysis of the packet structure reveals that only data
fields of the GeoNetworking layer are aware of security.







































Fig. 3. Security related packet flow (outgoing)
the routing layer. VANET applications providing services
such as Cooperative Awareness (CA) or Decentralized
Environmental Notification (DEN) can influence the en-
capsulation of their messages by a control parameter called
“security profile”. Such a profile is an internal parameter
and is not encoded in the transmitted packets at all but
it is used to choose an appropriate certificate during the
encapsulation and signing process. After decapsulation
at the receiver side, the GeoNetworking layer passes the
message along with control parameters to its upper layer.
One of these control parameters reports the security level
of the received packet, so the receiving application can
then decide how much confidence it puts in this particular
message.
Fortunately, the envisaged testbed for DUTs can build upon
several already existing building blocks. On the one hand
side, Vanetza 2 is an open-source implementation of the
ITS-G5 protocols including GeoNetworking capabilities.
On the other hand, the simulation framework Artery
integrates Vanetza and combines it with virtual IEEE
802.11p compliant network interface cards. Each simulated
vehicle within Artery can be equipped with a middleware,
which models the Facilities and Application layer according
to the ITS reference architecture (ETSI, 2010). This
middleware is thus the simulation’s runtime environment
for VANET applications such as the CA and DEN service.
When an application generates a message as depicted in
Figure 3, this message is yet unsecured. Just on arrival at
the GeoNetworking layer security operations are applied to
messages depending on the itsGnSecurity flag stored in the
Management Information Base (MIB). If itsGnSecurity is
enabled, plaintext messages are encapsulated in a security
envelope and become secured messages as a result. For
this purpose Vanetza has been extended to read and write
the secured message format, i.e. raw bits and bytes can
be converted to appropriate data structure and vice versa.
Furthermore, this basic encoding and decoding feature
2 https://github.com/riebl/vanetza
is supported by the security entity, which handles these
secured messages functionally. First and foremost the
security entity is responsible for calculating signatures
of outgoing packets and verify signatures of incoming
packets. These calculations are by far the computationally
most expensive steps executed in the GeoNetworking layer,
especially compared to the actual routing.
3.2 Deferred cryptography
The idea for reducing the negative performance impact
due to cryptographic signature calculations stems from
the fact of having only a single DUT linked with many
simulated vehicles in the proposed testbed. There is no need
to calculate signatures for packets exchanged only between
simulated vehicles since those vehicles are completely under
control of the testbed and the absence of attackers can
be guaranteed. Hence, only for packets deemed visible
for the DUT the costly signing needs to be actually
executed. Which packets are ultimately visible for the
DUT is determined by the radio propagation model used
in the simulation through signal loss induced by distance,
interference and shadowing effects. Since the nodes in a
VANET are usually vehicles and thus highly mobile, the
signal loss occurring for a packet can only be calculated
when it is actually transmitted, i.e. leaving the sender at
the (virtual) antenna. Those time-varying environmental
parameters cannot be determined in advance. Even the
exact transmission time is unfeasible to determine because
of various queues located in the MAC and GeoNetworking
layer. These queues can delay packet transmissions diversely.
Thus, at the time of encapsulating the payload in a secured
message it is very hard to predict if the packet will be
received by the DUT’s simulated counterpart later on.
In ordinary ITS stack implementations the security entity
calculates the signature at this encapsulation time point, no
matter if anybody is listening to its transmissions. Contrary
to specialised OBUs, where cryptographic calculations
are usually accelerated by a dedicated Hardware Security
Module (HSM), the simulation shall be executable on off-
the-shelf computer hardware and has to calculate signatures
of all simulated nodes. Because of the increased amount of
calculations and the lack of specialised hardware there is a
need for strategies reducing this computational burden. For
our simulation-centric stack the already implemented de-
ferred (or lazy) serialization concept is extended. Deferred
serialization postpones the actual conversion of packet
header data structures to their binary form until this format
is actually needed, e.g. when it has to be transmitted over
a real network card. Packets circling within the simulation
keep their original data structures per layer, so unnecessary
serialisation and deserialisation procedures are omitted.
One has to keep in mind, though, that all data structures
are already complete when they are added to a packet, i.e.
all required computations except for the straightforward
conversion to its binary representation are finished.
For signature creation this concept has to be taken one
step further by postponing the computation itself and thus
the completion of the data structure. This is conceptually
related to lazy evaluation (Henderson and Morris, 1976)
known from some programming languages like Haskell. The
term “lazy cryptography” is avoided in favour of “deferred
cryptography” because cryptography itself is not weakened.
This might be confused with laziness otherwise. While the
signature length is known a-priori, the actual signature’s
bytes are comparatively expensive to calculate. Thus, a
placeholder is put in the secured message’s data structure
instead of the signature. This placeholder can later be
converted to the real signature on-demand, e.g. when
the secured message needs to get serialised or a receiver
wants to verify the incoming packet. For this purpose the
placeholder contains a Future, which can be understood as
asynchronous return value. Futures are a feature of several
programming languages for concurrent code execution
(Baker and Hewitt, 1977). Signature futures in our model
contain the private key, the data to be signed and the
associated function for the actual signature calculation.
This endeavour can be considered complementary to other
approaches reducing the security processing overhead
as described by Jin and Papadimitratos (2015). Their
approach reduces the average computational costs for
packet verification by a single network participant. From a
global perspective, however, every signature still needs to
be verified by at least one receiver. The approach of this
paper then again aims at accelerating the signing process
for testbeds. Computational load is concentrated at one
machine instead of being spread over a multitude of OBUs.
4. EVALUATION
The usefulness of the proposed model is evaluated by
measuring the execution times of Artery running a map
scenario with various traffic densities and parameters
influencing the security handling. All measurements are
based on the LuST scenario, a SUMO road network
modelling the traffic of Luxembourg city (Codeca et al.,
2015). Four traffic variants (T1-4) have been investigated
as summarised in Table 1. These variants differ in the
starting times when observation of network communication
starts respectively. Later starting times are tied with
more vehicles on the roads. While the total number of
transmitted (Tx) packets increases linearly with the number
of vehicles, the total number of received (Rx) packets rises
overproportionally due to denser traffic. All transmissions
in these scenarios carry CA messages, which are generated
accordingly to the rules specified in ETSI (2014b, Section
6.1.3). Since these rules evaluate a vehicle’s dynamics –
changes in position, speed and direction – the vehicle’s
route in combination with surrounding traffic affects the
number of transmissions per vehicle. For example, the
DUT’s transmission numbers are of same magnitude but
unequal for all four 30 s long traffic scenarios. More overall
traffic, however, does not automatically imply more packet
receptions as the comparison of receptions by DUT for T3
and T4 shows.
Since the execution times of the simulation are highly
dependent on the performance of the used computer,
a baseline measurement is given for which no secured
messages are used at all. This baseline measurement rests
upon the off configuration with switched off itsGnSecurity
option in the GeoNetworking layer (ETSI, 2014a, Annex G),
so no messages are encapsulated in a security envelope.
Thus, these packets are faster to generate and occupy less
time on the wireless channel due to shorter packet length.
Table 1. Summary of simulated scenarios
traffic volumes
T1 T2 T3 T4
starting time t0 180 s 460 s 90 min 210 min
simulation time window [t0, t0 + 30 s]
number of vehicles at t0 49 101 204 341
Tx packets (DUT) 153 106 133 105
Rx packets (DUT) 189 1023 2448 2080
Tx packets (total) 6146 13786 26051 44142
Rx packets (total) 16394 88565 395716 956284
Table 2. Overview of security configurations
configuration sign verify
off disabled disabled
full by each sender by each receiver
full-trust by each sender skipped





One vehicle is selected to represent the DUT in each traffic
scenario T1-4, i.e. this vehicle acts as DUT’s proxy in the
simulated environment. The proxy’s behaviour is different
from other simulated vehicles: Packets received by this
proxy are going to be forwarded to the DUT and packets
emitted by the DUT are injected through this proxy into the
simulated VANET. Because the measurements in this paper
shall not be influenced by a particular DUT’s behaviour,
no DUT hardware is used in this evaluation setup. The
proxy’s special behaviour is still considered by serialising
all its received packets into binary form as if they were
going to be transmitted over-the-air. Vice versa, injected
packets are only present in binary form as well, whereas
packets originating from other nodes are available as data
structures, so no parsing is required for these. Consequently,
the induced computational load for this setup is mostly
the same as with a DUT attached to the testbed.
Contrary to off, the full configuration computes signatures
for every generated packet and hence communication
between all network nodes is cryptographically secured.
Configuration defer implements on-demand packet signing
as presented in Section 3, i.e. only signatures of packets
eventually received by the proxy are actually calculated.
Nevertheless, the overhead in terms of packet length is still
respected for all packets. Those two configurations with a
-trust suffix exhibit a modified packet verification behaviour:
The signature of every received packet is verified with
configuration full, whereas with full-trust no verification
takes place, i.e. any packet is blindly trusted. This approach
eliminates a lot of expensive calculations and can be
tolerated for a testbed where no real harm can be done.
Even more, trusting all packets circulating within the
simulation is a prerequisite for efficient operation with
on-demand signatures. Otherwise, the signature of every
packet would need to be calculated albeit being deferred,
except when a packet is not received by any network node
at all. Table 2 summarises all studied configurations along
with their main implications.
Measured execution times of two generic computer systems
are shown in Table 3 and 4, respectively. Depending
on the traffic volume, defer-trust is capable to truncate
Table 3. Execution times in seconds (System A)
T1 T2 T3 T4
configuration each simulation with 30 s duration
off 8.7 23.8 77.8 179.2
full 93.7 463.7 2015.0 4849.6
full-trust 16.2 47.6 154.0 349.3
defer 94.3 465.2 2018.7 4863.2
defer-trust 12.4 39.3 140.1 324.2
Table 4. Execution times in seconds (System B)
T1 T2 T3 T4
configuration each simulation with 30 s duration
off 64.9 179.4 607.2 1408.2
full 228.1 1043.7 4436.6 10678.5
full-trust 70.5 194.5 644.9 1483.7
defer 227.3 1043.2 4437.4 10681.0
defer-trust 68.0 186.6 622.3 1449.4
execution times compared to full-trust : On system A,
defer-trust shrinks to 77–93 % of the time required for
full-trust. These reductions are less distinctive on system
B, which is also considerably slower than system A in
general. Figure 4 depicts the performance penalty induced
by security relative to the configuration off without security
features. According to this, a faster system (such as A)
benefits more from the presented simulation model design
than a slower system (such as B).
Because of the outnumbering packet receptions compared to
transmissions, omitting verifications in -trust configurations
has a staggering effect on the execution performance. Fur-
thermore, a slight performance penalty is observable when
all signatures need to be calculated but their calculation
is only deferred. Since creating signatures at a later point
in time is in fact not more computationally complex than
immediate signing, it should be possible to minimise this
observed penalty without too much effort, though.
So far, all cryptographic operations were realised with
the help of the Crypto++ library (Dai et al., 2010).
Since a large share of processing time is allotted to these
operations, the selected cryptographic library can influence
the overall simulation performance significantly. While
this paper focusses on the outlined simulation design
rather than mere performance numbers, preliminary tests
were conducted using OpenSSL (Young et al., 2016) as
alternative cryptographic library. For these tests, pre-built
versions of Crypto++ and OpenSSL from the system’s
package repository were used for compiling the simulation
binary. As expected, the off configuration results in equal
run times for Crypto++ and OpenSSL. Latter, however,
takes only about 60 % of Crypto++’s run time for the full
configuration while the processed data were identical.
The employed cryptography library can be selected through
a runtime parameter for each vehicle, i.e. simulated vehicles
can be equipped with differing implementations. These
could also make use of specialised hardware such as HSMs.
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Fig. 4. Execution times relative to configuration off
5. CONCLUSION
Preserving real-time requirements for VANET testbeds is
challenging, especially with cryptographic computations
for many vehicles. However, the presented results show
that computational load and execution time of VANET
simulations can be reduced considerably when signature
calculations are deferred. Only for packets leaving the
simulation boundary these calculations are inevitable, i.e.
when a DUT is attached to the simulation-based testbed
and communication takes place between them.
While the created packets have a valid binary format
according to ETSI standards, the current implementation
is in several regards still simplistic. Identity management
and pseudonym changes are currently not implemented,
i.e. used identifiers such as GeoNetworking addresses and
station identifiers in CA messages are static. This is not
much of a problem for a testbed where no real driver’s
privacy is put at risk because of this limitation.
In the future, the remaining packet signing and verifying
operations could be sped-up by a more optimised implemen-
tation of the ECDSA algorithm, possibly utilising the power
of a Graphics Processing Unit (GPU). Another acceleration
approach might be offloading of cryptographic calculations
onto a HSM if available. This requires, however, that this
chip has a sufficient number of certificates at disposal and
can switch between them fast enough for mimicking all of
a DUT’s simulated neighbours.
For demonstration purposes we issued all certificates
ourselves, i.e. a DUT has to be configured in a way
accepting our certificate and vice versa. The testbed can
be easily extended to use other certificates as well, though.
The computational costs are the same for certificate chains
of same length, so conclusions about the proposed testbed
design are still valid.
Future revisions of the standards might change security
interfaces: The aforementioned security profile is going to
be replaced by a more sophisticated certificate selection
method based on ITS Application Identifiers (AIDs) and
required Service Specific Permissions (SSPs). These data
fields are also included in ITS certificates and thus allow
plausibility checks whether a vehicle is actually authorised
to set certain application data fields, e.g. special options
reserved for emergency vehicles. While the encoding of
these features is already implemented, the security entity
itself does neither check nor use them for now.
We welcome contributions of other researchers to both
open-source projects – Artery and Vanetza – which include
the implementation of the ideas outlined in this paper.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Remarkable implementation efforts concerning various
security features of Vanetza have to be attributed to
following students: Stefan Kopitzki, Robert Lamprecht,
Christina Obermaier, Aaron Seidler, and Sebastian Urich.
REFERENCES
Baker, Jr., H.C. and Hewitt, C. (1977). The incremental
garbage collection of processes. In Proceedings of the
1977 Symposium of Artificial Intelligence and Program-
ming Languages, 55–59. ACM, New York, NY, USA.
Basaras, P., Maglaras, L.A., Katsaros, D., and Janicke, H.
(2015). A robust eco-routing protocol against malicious
data in vehicular network. In 8th IFIP Wireless and
Mobile Networking Conference (WMNC 2015). IFIP.
Bibhu, V., Roshan, K., Singh, K.B., and Singh, D.K.
(2012). Performance analysis of black hole attack in
VANET. International Journal of Computer Network
and Information Security (IJCNIS), 4(11), 47.
Buttyán, L., Holczer, T., and Vajda, I. (2007). On the
effectiveness of changing pseudonyms to provide location
privacy in VANETs. In Security and Privacy in Ad-hoc
and Sensor Networks, 129–141. Springer.
Codeca, L., Frank, R., and Engel, T. (2015). LuST: a
24-hour scenario of Luxembourg city for SUMO traffic
simulations. In SUMO2015 – Intermodal Simulation for
Intermodal Transport. Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und
Raumfahrt e.V. Institut für Verkehrssystemtechnik.
Dai, W. et al. (2010). Crypto++. URL http://www.
cryptopp.com. Version 5.6.1.
DOT (2011). Vehicle Safety Communications - Applications
(VSC-A) Final Report: Appendix Volume 3 Security. U.S.
Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration.
Douceur, J.R. (2002). The sybil attack. In Peer-to-peer
Systems, 251–260. Springer.
ETSI (2010). EN 302 665 - Intelligent Transport Sys-
tems (ITS); Communications Architecture. European
Telecommunications Standards Institute, v1.1.1 edition.
ETSI (2014a). EN 302 636-4-1 - Intelligent Transport
Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; GeoNetwork-
ing; Part 4: Geographical addressing and forwarding for
point-to-point and point-to-multipoint communications;
Sub-part 1: Media-Independent Functionality. European
Telecommunications Standards Institute, v1.2.1 edition.
ETSI (2014b). EN 302 637-2 - Intelligent Transport
Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; Basic Set
of Applications; Part 2: Specification of Cooperative
Awareness Basic Service. European Telecommunications
Standards Institute, v1.3.2 edition.
ETSI (2015). TS 103 097 - Intelligent Transport Sys-
tems (ITS); Security; Security header and certificate for-
mats. European Telecommunications Standards Institute,
v1.2.1 edition.
Henderson, P. and Morris, Jr., J.H. (1976). A lazy evaluator.
In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN
Symposium on Principles on Programming Languages,
POPL ’76, 95–103. ACM, New York, NY, USA.
Jin, H. and Papadimitratos, P. (2015). Scaling VANET
security through cooperative message verification. In
Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC), 2015 IEEE,
275–278.
Larson, U.E., Nilsson, D.K., and Jonsson, E. (2008). An
approach to specification-based attack detection for in-
vehicle networks. In Intelligent Vehicles Symposium,
2008 IEEE, 220–225. IEEE.
Maglaras, L.A. (2015). A novel distributed intrusion
detection system for vehicular ad hoc networks. In-
ternational Journal of Advanced Computer Science and
Applications(IJACSA), 6(4), 101–106.
Mejri, M.N., Ben-Othman, J., and Hamdi, M. (2014).
Survey on VANET security challenges and possible
cryptographic solutions. Vehicular Communications,
1(2), 53–66.
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